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Abstract
Research Question/Issue: We explore how the interrelations of governance mech-
anisms (“bundles”) influence a firm's propensity for corporate acquisitions. Focus-
ing on four key internal and external mechanisms, namely, board of directors
monitoring, CEO pay incentives, takeover market discipline, and institutional inves-
tor monitoring, we use a sample of 1171 completed M&A deals by 799 U.S. firms
during the period 1998–2015 to test the Substitution versus Complementarity
Hypotheses.
Research Findings/Insights: The findings provide, in the main, support for both the
Substitution and the Complementarity Hypotheses, with several incentives alignment,
internal and external monitoring mechanisms acting as substitutes and complements
of each other toward firm acquisitiveness.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results challenge the notion that corporate
governance mechanisms purely function as independent factors and contribute to
the configurational perspective of corporate governance. They offer new evidence
that combinations or “bundles” of firm-level governance mechanisms can allow for
differing degrees of firm acquisitiveness.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Different governance “bundles” will have different
implications for major strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Firms seek-
ing to control or increase acquisition propensity can thus consider “equifinal” gover-
nance configurations, whereby alternative combinations of governance mechanisms
can lead to comparable, desired outcomes.
K E YWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Mergers and Acquisitions1 (hereafter referred to as M&A) are among
the most significant corporate investments employed by firms in the
pursuit of growth and shareholder wealth creation. Although there is
a significant body of research across academic disciplines on the
determinants of corporate acquisitions, this research has been rather
disparate in identifying the relative importance of different drivers
and how multiple drivers may simultaneously work in influencing firm
acquisitiveness (Haleblian et al., 2009; Laamanen, 2007). Accordingly,
Haleblian et al. (2009) emphasize the need for additional evidence on
the influence of governance mechanisms, such as board structure,
executive compensation, and blockholder ownership on firm acquisi-
tion behavior.
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Corporate acquisitions represent major and discrete strategic
events, but they have also been argued to exacerbate the inherent
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers in large pub-
lic firms (Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007; Morck et al., 1990). M&A,
for instance, can be the result of managerial self-interest, inconsistent
with shareholder value maximization, such as empire building
(e.g., Andrade et al., 2001; Jensen, 1986) and employment risk reduc-
tion (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Acquisition decisions can be the source of
a wide divergence of interests between shareholders and managers
and, therefore, have been frequently investigated using the agency
theory lens, which is also very popular in governance research
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A number of recent studies in the empiri-
cal literature further supports the notion that corporate acquisitive-
ness ranks highly in both finance and management research agendas
in relation to behavioral, decision-making, gender-related, and person-
ality dimensions (Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Jenter & Lewellen, 2015;
Shi et al., 2017; Yim, 2013). Irrespective of their short- and long-term
outcomes, acquisition decisions represent a conduit for managerial
risk-taking, opportunism, and agency issues. Thus, the M&A frame-
work provides a suitable setting to explore the role of governance in
influencing corporate investment policy.
The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
firm performance has long been at the center of governance scholar-
ship. However, the evidence from this prolific research has yielded
mixed results. For example, studies of the effects of board characteris-
tics (e.g., board independence, leadership, and structure) and owner-
ship structure on corporate financial performance have failed to
provide consistent evidence of significant and systematic effects
(e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2007; Deutsch, 2005). The fact
that the extant literature has produced mixed and inconsistent results
is due, at least in part, to the examination of governance mechanisms
in isolation from each other, without considering their joint effects
(Desender et al., 2016; García-Castro et al., 2013; Oh et al., 2018).
To overcome this shortcoming, a more holistic approach to corpo-
rate governance has been proposed, by considering a configurational
perspective of governance mechanisms. Under this configurational
perspective, substitutive and/or complementary effects between gov-
ernance mechanisms result in the creation of multiple combinations or
“bundles” of such mechanisms (Rediker & Seth, 1995) that work
effectively together toward specific firm outcomes (Aguilera
et al., 2012; Aguilera et al., 2015; Cuomo et al., 2016). According to
Rediker and Seth (1995, p. 87), “firm performance depends on the
efficiency of a bundle of governance mechanisms (authors' italics),”
which implies that different mechanisms can interact with each other
in a complex way to influence organizational outcomes. Essentially, it
is not unreasonable to expect that governance mechanisms will oper-
ate jointly, and therefore, organizational outcomes will be dependent
on the effectiveness of some bundles of governance mechanisms
(Aguilera et al., 2012). Governance practices share a common goal and
collectively constitute the organizational context for the governance
environments, but they do have different characteristics, roles, and
functions. Thus, to understand how organizational outcomes are
affected by multiple governance mechanisms, the attention should be
on their interactive influence and how they might have different
effects depending on how they are combined (Oh et al., 2018).
To date, there has been limited empirical research into this con-
figurational perspective of corporate governance. A growing number
of studies have, however, confirmed the validity of the bundle
approach. For example, Desender et al. (2016) show that, in order to
protect their interests, shareholder-oriented foreign owners introduce
their own practices in the existing bundle of governance mechanisms
normally found in a stakeholder context withing a certain country.
Furthermore, using a panel sample of U.S. firms for 6 years, Oh et al.
(2018) find that multiple governance mechanisms mainly work as sub-
stitutes in influencing corporate social responsibility (CSR) and suggest
that different combinations of governance mechanisms can achieve
similar levels of CSR. Additionally, Florackis et al. (2015) employ a
semi-parametric approach and find that ownership and dividends act
as substitute mechanisms in reducing agency costs of free-cash-flow,
but only in the presence of high debt monitoring. Finally, employing a
fuzzy set/qualitative comparative approach, García-Castro et al.
(2013) reveal that in different national contexts, the bundle of gover-
nance practices in a firm entails relationships that are not necessarily
monotonic and cumulative; they, thus, conclude that there are multi-
ple bundles that can lead to superior organizational performance.
Drawing from this theoretical approach, the main objective of this
study is, consequently, to address the aforementioned gaps both in
the M&A and corporate governance literatures and explore the inter-
relations of certain firm-specific governance mechanisms with respect
to influencing a firm's propensity to undertake corporate acquisitions.
By deploying the “complement versus substitute framework”
(Oh et al., 2018, p. 2717), we apply the concept of marginal effect to
gauge if multiple governance mechanisms operate as complements or
substitutes in the M&A setting, essentially whether they work syner-
gistically or competitively.
Given the multifaceted nature of corporate governance, this
study focusses on four key governance mechanisms, namely board
monitoring, CEO pay incentives, external market discipline, and insti-
tutional investor monitoring. M&A are complex corporate investments
with highly uncertain outcomes and can have major valuation effects
for the acquirer's shareholders. Thus, as acquisition decisions require
board approval, studying the impact of board monitoring characteris-
tics on a firm's acquisition propensity is particularly salient. In addition,
given that the CEO of a firm typically initiates an M&A deal, it is inter-
esting to examine the role of CEO pay incentives in influencing acqui-
sition decisions as these are important determinants in the alignment
of governance mechanisms. Moreover, given the increasing impor-
tance of institutional investor ownership in U.S. public firms (Derrien
et al., 2013), these shareholders have a vested interest in influencing
acquisition decisions and represent another monitoring, yet external
governance mechanism.
Using a sample of U.S. firm acquisitions for the period from
1998 to 2015 and drawing from the literature on the configurational
perspective in corporate governance, we empirically test the Substitu-
tion versus Complementarity Hypotheses in the context of M&A deci-
sions (e.g., Vives, 1990). As mentioned earlier, the substitutive
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assumption (e.g., Oh et al., 2018; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Zajac &
Westphal, 1994) suggests that one governance mechanism may
weaken the marginal effects of another mechanism on firm out-
comes. This, in turn, implies that simultaneously deploying multiple
governance mechanisms may not always lead to optimal outcomes,
as the associated costs of additional mechanisms may exceed their
benefits. On the contrary, the complementarity view (e.g., Cremers &
Nair, 2005; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Schepker & Oh, 2013)
assumes that two (or more) governance mechanisms work in a syner-
gistic fashion and that one mechanism could increase the marginal
effects of another one. If this is the case, two (or more) governance
mechanisms need to be simultaneously deployed to obtain optimal
outcomes.
Our empirical results provide support for both the Substitution
and Complementarity Hypotheses. We find that incentive alignment
and external market discipline mechanisms can act as substitutes and
complements of each other in influencing the likelihood of a firm to
undertake an acquisition. We also detect complementary effects in
the case of board and institutional investor monitoring and substitu-
tive effects of institutional investor monitoring and external market
discipline mechanisms toward acquisition propensity. As such, we
make several contributions to both the M&A and corporate gover-
nance literatures. First, taking into account the under-examined inter-
active effects between different governance mechanisms (Cuomo
et al., 2016), our results add to the existing M&A literature on the
determinants of acquisition activity (Aktas et al., 2016) by identifying
a set of predictor variables in the form of firm-level governance con-
figurations. Furthermore, this study contributes to the configurational
perspective of corporate governance research (Aguilera et al., 2008;
Aguilera et al., 2012; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Ward et al., 2009),
suggesting that degrees of firm acquisitiveness can be achieved
through different combinations or “bundles” of firm-level governance
mechanisms. In accordance with the idea of “equifinality” (Gresov &
Drazin, 1997; Rediker & Seth, 1995), firms can be flexible in designing
their bundle of governance practices so as to achieve predetermined
outcomes and, in this case, the desired levels of acquisition
propensity.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Agency theory-based research generally assumes that firm-level gov-
ernance mechanisms operate independently and, therefore, has pre-
dominantly investigated them separately. However, as mentioned
earlier, this line of research has not been able to establish a definitive
link between individual governance mechanisms and firm perfor-
mance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2007; Deutsch, 2005).
One possible explanation for these contrasting findings is that, since
various governance mechanisms coexist within firms, more attention
should be paid toward exploring the interconnections between these
mechanisms, which essentially means treating them as a governance
“bundle” (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Rediker &
Seth, 1995; Ward et al., 2009).
2.1 | The interdependence of governance
mechanisms
A growing body within the governance literature has adopted a con-
figurational perspective, which posits that firm performance depends
on the effectiveness of the “bundle” of governance arrangements,
rather than the effectiveness of any single governance mechanism
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Rediker & Seth, 1995;
Ward et al., 2009). The configurational approach in corporate gover-
nance assumes that in order to achieve a desired firm outcome, the
interdependencies of governance mechanisms should be considered
(Oh et al., 2018). This suggests the existence of multiple combinations
or “bundles” of governance mechanisms and therefore challenges uni-
versalistic policy prescriptions (Aguilera et al., 2008; Cuomo
et al., 2016). Additionally, it supports the notion of “equifinality,”
whereby alternative combinations of governance mechanisms can
lead to similar firm outcomes (Gresov & Drazin, 1997; Rediker &
Seth, 1995). In these studies focusing on the interdependence of gov-
ernance mechanisms, two alternative hypotheses have been devel-
oped, namely, the Substitution and Complementarity Hypotheses.
2.2 | The substitution hypothesis
First, the Substitution Hypothesis predicts that governance mechanisms
can substitute one another and, in doing so, effectively mitigate
agency costs, including considering the costly implementation of these
mechanisms in a firm (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). This assumption
has already received robust empirical support. For example, several
studies provide evidence of substitutive effects between monitoring
and incentive alignment mechanisms with respect to organizational
outcomes such as firm value—as measured by Tobin's Q—(Kim &
Lu, 2011; Randøy & Goel, 2003) and corporate social responsibility
(Oh et al., 2018). In the same spirit, other studies find support for the
substitutive perspective between various monitoring governance
mechanisms with regard to outcomes such as firm performance—again
measured by Tobin's Q (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996)—and the impact
on shareholder wealth associated with the adoption of antitakeover
provisions (Sundaramurthy et al., 1997).
In the context of this study, our assumption is that the cost–
benefit implication of having multiple governance mechanisms is a
driver of firm acquisitiveness. The substitutive perspective implies
that if certain governance mechanisms are sufficiently present, the
costs of implementing additional mechanisms—either monitoring or
incentive alignment—may exceed the benefits. Therefore, the joint
presence of multiple governance mechanisms may not always be
effective in achieving certain firm outcomes (i.e., acquisitions in our
case).
Consequently, using the marginal effects concept—as employed
in the field of economics (e.g., Vives, 1990)—we will observe the exis-
tence of substitutive effects between two governance mechanisms if
one governance mechanism decreases the marginal effect of another
mechanism on firm acquisitiveness. The substitutive perspective
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implies that if certain governance mechanisms are sufficiently present,
the costs of implementing additional mechanisms—either monitoring
or incentives alignment—may exceed the potential benefits. Conse-
quently, the simultaneous existence of multiple governance mecha-
nisms may not always be optimal in achieving certain firm outcomes,
and so, the marginal effect of each mechanism will not be strength-
ened or will even be weakened.
2.3 | The complementarity hypothesis
Conversely, the Complementarity Hypothesis posits that the coexis-
tence of multiple firm-level governance mechanisms is required in
order to reduce a firm's agency costs, which implies synergistic effects
among governance mechanisms. A recent stream of research confirms
the presence of complementary effects between monitoring and
incentives alignment governance mechanisms, for instance, with
respect to reducing information asymmetry and mitigating agency
costs (Rutherford et al., 2007), repealing poison pills (Schepker &
Oh, 2013) and improving firm profitability in terms of ROA
(Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). Other studies also offer evidence in favor
of complementarities between various monitoring governance mecha-
nisms. Cremers and Nair (2005), for example, find evidence that
shareholder activism and the market for corporate control work
together as complements toward increasing shareholder wealth in
terms of long-term equity returns, where annualized abnormal returns
between 10% and 15% are generated only in the presence of high
public pension fund (blockholder) ownership. Offering further evi-
dence of complementarity effects, Masulis et al. (2007) extend the
work of Cremers and Nair (2005) by demonstrating that acquirers that
face more pressure from the market from corporate control, operate
in industries with higher competition and separate the positions of
CEO and chairperson, engage in more profitable acquisitions in terms
of higher abnormal announcement returns.
In the specific context of M&A, the complementarity perspective
implies that the adoption of multiple governance mechanisms would
have a greater impact on a firm's acquisition propensity than either
governance mechanism in isolation. As suggested by Oh et al. (2018),
complementarity, therefore, assumes that governance mechanisms
work in a synergistic fashion and the adoption of certain combinations
of governance mechanisms is required to maximize their impact on
firm outcomes, such as firm acquisitiveness in our case. On the basis
of the marginal effects concept, two governance mechanisms are com-
plementary when the marginal effect of one increases the marginal
effect of the other on firm acquisitiveness.
2.4 | Governance bundles and firm acquisitiveness
Traditional agency theory-based assumptions suggest that higher
levels of equity-based compensation should create long-term incen-
tives for managers toward maximizing shareholder value
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). As such, CEOs having
equity compensation as a substantial part of their compensation pack-
age are more likely to engage in strategic investments such as M&A,
which could benefit not only shareholder value in the long-term but
also enhance their personal wealth through these investments. In
other words, if the CEO believes that undertaking M&A pays off over
the long run, firms will be more likely to increase their acquisitiveness.
Since monitoring governance mechanisms, such as the board of
directors or the presence of institutional investors, are employed in
order to reduce managerial opportunism, acquisition decisions are
expected to receive intensive scrutiny, given also their inherent com-
plexity and the potential major long-term consequences on the share-
holder wealth of the acquirer. For example, the board of directors, as
the primary monitoring mechanism in a public firm, is involved in the
approval (or rejection) of strategic initiatives proposed by the firm's
management and is expected to constrain CEO discretion, particularly
in cases where the proposed M&A may be driven by value-destroying
motives, such as hubris (Roll, 1986), empire building (e.g., Andrade
et al., 2001; Jensen, 1986), and employment risk reduction (Amihud &
Lev, 1981). Likewise, large and concentrated institutional investors
are expected to engage in active monitoring and scrutinize the acqui-
sition decisions of their investee firms for shared gain. Therefore,
monitoring governance mechanisms will be more likely to curb firm
acquisition propensity.
With reference to the second governance mechanism, if the posi-
tive effect of CEO pay incentives (incentive alignment mechanism) on
acquisition propensity becomes weaker (i.e., has a smaller marginal
effect) in the presence of high levels of a monitoring governance
mechanism, for example, in the form of a large or independent board
of directors, then this would suggest that there is a substitutive effect
between CEO pay incentives and board monitoring on firm acquisition
propensity. In a similar vein, if the negative effect of a strong board of
directors on acquisition propensity becomes weaker when there is a
high level of large and concentrated institutional shareholders, then
this would also suggest that these two monitoring mechanisms act as
substitutes for each other in reducing firm acquisitiveness. In this case,
additional monitoring by another monitoring mechanism would not
significantly affect the firm's acquisition decision because monitoring
by one mechanism would be sufficient. If, on the other hand, the neg-
ative effect of a strong board of directors increases in magnitude
(i.e., has a greater marginal effect) concurrently with the presence of a
high level of institutional ownership concentration (compared with
when there is a low level of institutional ownership concentration),
then this would imply a complementary effect between the two moni-
toring mechanisms.
Finally, the two conflicting hypotheses (Substitution
vs. Complementarity) suggest that governance “bundles” will likely
operate in different ways toward influencing firm outcomes. Given
that extant research has not provided a uniform answer as yet, the
synergies (or not) are dependent on the types of governance mecha-
nisms investigated and the exploratory nature of the study, our main
research question is, therefore, formulated as follows: “To what
extent do firm-level governance mechanisms operate in a substitutive
and/or a complementary fashion in influencing firm acquisitiveness?”
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3 | RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 | Data and sample selection
The initial sample of this study comprises the whole population of
U.S. public firms from Compustat Fundamentals Annual from 1997
through 2014. We collect the data on board of director characteristics
and firm anti-takeover provisions from ISS (formerly known as
RiskMetrics and IRRC before that), CEO compensation data from
ExecuComp and institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial
13F. The above merging process results in a sample of 2,476 unique
firms with 21,696 firm-year observations. We obtain acquisition data
for U.S. public acquirers from Thomson One Banker with domestic
deals that took place between January 1, 1998, and December
31, 2015.2
We then match the two samples to identify both acquirers and
non-acquirers. Following previous studies, we exclude all financials
(SIC 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999). Finally, all firms must
have complete data on the variables used in the empirical analysis.
The above procedure resulted in an unbalanced panel3 of 1,639
unique firms with 11,418 firm-year observations. Within this sample,
there are 1,171 completed M&A deals by 799 acquirers during the
1998–2015 period.
3.2 | Variables
3.2.1 | Dependent variable
In order to measure M&A activity, we use a continuous variable which
is the sum of the completed acquisition deal values in a given year
scaled by the acquirer's total assets in the previous year as in Pan
et al. (2016).
3.2.2 | Independent variables
The main variables of interest are proxies for board monitoring,
CEO pay incentives, institutional investor monitoring, and monitor-
ing by the takeover market. First, board monitoring is proxied by
three variables (previously discussed), which have been associated
with the monitoring effectiveness of the board (e.g., Linck
et al., 2008; Wintoki et al., 2012): board size, a refined measure of
board independence (non-co-opted independence) and CEO/Chair
duality. Board size equals the number of directors on the board.
Non-co-opted independence is measured as the fraction of directors
who are independent and were appointed before the CEO
assumed office, as in Coles et al. (2014). Non-co-opted indepen-
dence has been shown to increase the monitoring effectiveness
of the board with regard to certain CEO features (turnover-
performance sensitivity, total annual compensation, and pay-
performance sensitivity or delta) and firm decisions (capital
expenditure) (Coles et al., 2014). CEO/Chair duality is a binary
variable which is equal to one if the CEO serves also as the Chair-
man of the board.
Second, we employ CEO vega and delta as proxies for CEO pay
incentives. These variables are estimated following the approximation
method developed by Core and Guay (2002), which uses the Black
and Scholes (1973) model, allowing for dividends. CEO vega, otherwise
termed as pay-risk sensitivity, is the dollar change in the portfolio of
options of the CEO for a 1% change in the annual standard deviation
of stock returns at the fiscal year-end. In line with Guay (1999), the
vega of the equity portfolio is assumed to be zero, so only the vega of
the options portfolio is used. CEO delta (or the pay-performance sensi-
tivity) is the dollar change in the portfolio of equity and options
holdings of the CEO for a 1% change in the stock price at the fiscal
year-end. Delta is calculated as the sum of the deltas of the stock and
options portfolios. Furthermore, the CEO vega and delta are scaled by
cash compensation (Graham & Rogers, 2002; Hagendorff &
Vallascas, 2011; King et al., 2016), since pay incentives are correlated
with firm size and are also highly correlated between them. Scaling
the incentives measures also allows us to include both vega and delta
in a single model and consider differences in their magnitude. In addi-
tion to CEO pay incentives, we include CEO cash pay, the fixed com-
ponent in the compensation associated with CEO risk aversion. CEO
cash pay is calculated as the natural log transformation of the total
CEO pay in the form of cash compensation (salary and bonus).
Institutional ownership entails the third monitoring governance
mechanism employed. Given the heterogeneous preferences and
objectives of institutional investors, we employ institutional ownership
concentration—expressed as the percentage of the sum of
shareholdings by the five largest institutional investors to the total
shares outstanding at the fiscal year-end—as a suitable proxy for the
monitoring incentives of institutional investors following, among
others, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Sauerwald et al. (2016), and
Goranova et al. (2017). Institutional investors with large shareholdings
are expected to have much stronger incentives to monitor and influ-
ence acquisition decisions because the M&A outcome can signifi-
cantly affect shareholder value.
Finally, we include a proxy for the external discipline imposed by
the takeover market, namely, the entrenchment index (E-Index), pro-
posed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). The E-Index is based on six anti-
takeover provisions (staggered boards, limits on amending the charter,
limits on amending bylaws, supermajority requirements to approve a
merger, poison pills, and golden parachutes) that limit shareholder
rights and insulate managers from the pressure of the takeover mar-
ket. The presence of anti-takeover provisions makes firms less vulner-
able to takeovers and thus more likely to lead to managerial
entrenchment and facilitate the display of opportunistic behavior by
managers (Masulis et al., 2007). Each firm is assigned a score, from
0 to 6, based on the number of anti-takeover provisions that the firm
has in the given year. The higher the E-Index value, the higher the
probability of managerial entrenchment in the firm (Bebchuk
et al., 2009). With respect to acquisition activity, Gompers et al. (2003)
provide empirical evidence that firms with weaker shareholder rights
or many anti-takeover provisions tend to be more acquisitive.
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3.2.3 | Control variables
Following the extant literature, to control for other factors that poten-
tially influence a firm's decision to undertake an acquisition, we
include a variety of control variables in all model specifications. In par-
ticular, we include three sets of determinants focusing on firm, indus-
try, and CEO-specific characteristics.
In terms of firm-level variables, we control for firm size. Large
firms have been shown to undertake more acquisitions
(e.g., Harford, 1999). Next, we control for book leverage, since exces-
sive leverage may pose constraints on a firm's ability to acquire and
thus may decrease a firm's likelihood of making an acquisition.
Uysal (2011) documents a negative and significant effect between
overleverage and acquisition probability. Previous studies on acquisi-
tiveness (e.g., Levi et al., 2010, 2014) also control for a firm's sales
growth. We additional include Market-to-book ratio to account for the
effect of growth opportunities and Cash flows as in Croci and
Petmezas (2015). High levels of free cash flows enable firms to
undertake investments, hence increasing acquisition propensity
(Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008). Furthermore, firms with excess cash
reserves are more likely to carry out acquisitions (Jensen, 1986). To
measure cash reserves, we include cash holdings. We also control for
accounting performance using the firm's ROA (Sauerwald et al., 2016)
and CAPEX (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008) as a proxy for the scope
of managerial discretion in undertaking corporate investments. With
regard to the industry characteristics which may have an impact on
the acquisition likelihood, we add the M&A Liquidity Index, since there
is evidence of a positive association between this variable and the
likelihood of an acquisition (Uysal, 2011).
The last group of control variables refers to certain CEO charac-
teristics which have been linked with acquisitiveness. We control for
CEO tenure as a proxy for CEO power and entrenchment (Berger
et al., 1997; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), which may increase
acquisition likelihood. Additionally, we include the age and gender of
the CEO, two proxies of CEO risk aversion. Using a U.S. sample,
Yim (2013) reports a negative relationship between CEO age and
acquisition propensity, with younger CEOs pursuing more acquisi-
tions. With respect to CEO gender, there is evidence that, due to
female risk aversion and male overconfidence (Barber & Odean, 2001;
Croson & Gneezy, 2009), female directors and executives undertake
fewer acquisitions than their male counterparts (Huang &
Kisgen, 2013; Levi et al., 2014). We also control for CEO over-
confidence (Malmendier & Tate, 2008) under the assumption that
overconfident CEOs will be more acquisitive, especially in firms with
abundant cash reserves. Risk aversion and under-diversification are
expected to induce CEOs to exercise their stock options early if the
stock price is sufficiently high so as to “lock-in” a profit (Hall &
Murphy, 2002). As in Croci and Petmezas (2015), we construct CEO
overconfidence using the options-based measure developed by
Campbell et al. (2011). As a final CEO characteristic, we control for
CEO ownership although its effect on acquisition decisions is theoreti-
cally unclear. While incentives alignment mechanisms such as CEO
equity ownership may encourage acquisitions with the objective of
shareholder wealth creation, undiversified CEOs may forego risky but
value-increasing projects such as acquisitions (Coles et al., 2006).
To alleviate potential endogeneity concerns, all explanatory vari-
ables are lagged by 1 year with regard to the dependent variable. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level in both tails to
mitigate the influence of outliers on our results.
3.3 | Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
main analysis. Table A2 provides detailed definitions of all the vari-
ables. In line with Pan et al. (2016), Panel A shows that the average
rate of M&A activity is 2.5% (median 0%). Panel B focuses on the sta-
tistics of the independent variables. The average board of directors
consists of nine members, of which 36% are independent outsiders
non-co-opted by the CEO, suggesting that roughly a third of the
board consists of directors who are more likely to be truly indepen-
dent, thus acting as more effective monitors. These values compare
favorably with those reported by Coles et al. (2014). In about 60% of
the sample firms, the CEO is also the firm's Chair. Concerning the
CEO pay incentive structure, we observe that the pay incentives
scaled by cash compensation vary considerably in our sample. For
example, the median vega (delta) scaled is around 8% (25%) against a
mean value of 13% (83%). There is also noticeable institutional owner-
ship concentration in the sample firms; the average holdings of the
top five institutions in a firm is 29%. For comparison, the equivalent
number is approximately 25% in Goranova et al. (2017) with a sample
over the years 1997–2006.
Moving onto the summary statistics of the firm and industry char-
acteristics, as shown in Panel C, the average firm has total assets of
$7.6 billion, book leverage of 22.1%, sales growth of 9.4%, market-to-
book ratio of 2.05, cash flows of 8.9%, cash holdings of 14.7%, ROA
of 4.9%, and capital expenditures of 5.3%. These firm-level variables
are largely in line with those reported in prior studies examining the
impact of various governance or director characteristics on firm
acquisitiveness (e.g., Croci & Petmezas, 2015; Levi et al., 2014). At the
industry level, the mean M&A liquidity index is 0.015 and median
0.005. These figures are comparable with those in Uysal (2011).
Regarding the CEO characteristics, as reported in Panel D, the
average tenure of the CEO is 7.7 years, the average CEO age is
approximately 56 years old, and the CEO owns on average 1.8% of
the firm's common stock, confirming previous literature (e.g., Aktas
et al., 2019; Andreou et al., 2017). Furthermore, only a few firms have
a female CEO (2.5%) and 18.9% of CEOs are overconfident on
average.
As we deploy a relatively large number of corporate governance
mechanisms (board monitoring, CEO pay incentives, institutional
investor monitoring, and monitoring by the takeover market), caution
needs to be exercised throughout the empirical analysis, especially
with respect to the chance of multicollinearity. Table 2 illustrates all
pairwise correlations along with variance inflation factors (VIF) of all
the independent and control variables employed in the analysis. While
PANAYI ET AL. 407
a number of pairwise correlations appears significant, the VIFs of all
the key governance variables of interest rest between 1.18 (for
E-Index) and 1.64 (for Board Size) and well below the critical value of
4 (all tolerance scores >0.2).
3.4 | Methodology
We investigate the influences of the four key corporate governance
mechanisms (i.e., board of directors' characteristics, CEO pay incen-
tives, institutional ownership concentration and monitoring by the
takeover market) in an exploratory way so as to identify which, if any,
of these mechanisms act in a substitutive or complementary fashion
with each other. We test the substitutive/complementary effects of
these mechanisms on firm acquisitiveness by including in our specifi-
cations all pairwise two-way interaction terms by introducing product
terms and examining the marginal effect of one mechanism on
acquisitiveness depending on the levels of the other for the significant
interaction terms. For the purposes of this study, two governance
mechanisms interact as complements (substitutes) if the marginal
effect of one governance mechanism on firm acquisitiveness increases
(decreases) as the other governance mechanism increases (Poppo &
Zenger, 2002; Siggelkow, 2002). The aforementioned approach has
been employed, for instance, by studies exploring interactive relation-
ships between governance mechanisms in promoting a firm's corpo-
rate social responsibility (Oh et al., 2018).
Interaction effects are tested via hierarchical moderated regression
analysis (Elbanna & Child, 2007) in two steps: in the first step, which
represents the baseline model, only the main effects of the four gov-
ernance mechanisms of interest are included. In the second step, the
product terms are entered in a hierarchical manner, by adding each
interaction term with the associated main effects in a separate model.
In each case, a significant increase in R2 from the baseline model
(by means of an F test, i.e., the ratio of the variance explained only by
TABLE 1 Sample descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. Max.
Panel A: Dependent variable
M&A activity 11,418 2.50 10.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 78.70
Panel B: Independent variables
Board size 11,418 9.06 2.28 5.00 7.00 9.00 11.00 15.00
Non-co-opted independence (NCI) 11,418 0.36 0.27 −0.05 0.11 0.36 0.57 0.90
CEO/chair duality 11,418 0.58 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CEO vega (scaled) 11,418 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.93
CEO delta (scaled) 11,418 0.83 2.26 0.01 0.12 0.25 0.58 17.85
CEO cash pay 11,418 6.89 0.65 5.30 6.47 6.85 7.24 8.75
Institutional ownership concentration (IOC) 11,418 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.53
E-Index 11,418 3.13 1.33 0.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00
Panel C: Firm and industry characteristics
Firm size 11,418 7.60 1.50 4.68 6.51 7.47 8.58 11.48
Book leverage 11,418 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.21 0.33 0.70
Sales growth 11,418 0.09 0.20 −0.43 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.95
Market-to-book ratio 11,418 2.05 1.24 0.78 1.26 1.66 2.35 7.82
Cash flows 11,418 0.09 0.07 −0.19 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.26
Cash holdings 11,418 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.72
ROA 11,418 0.05 0.09 −0.39 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.27
CAPEX 11,418 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.27
M&A liquidity index 11,418 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.19
Panel D: CEO characteristics
CEO tenure 11,418 7.71 7.11 0.42 2.67 5.58 10.33 35.33
CEO age 11,418 55.60 6.73 40.00 51.00 56.00 60.00 73.00
CEO gender 11,418 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
CEO overconfidence 11,418 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
CEO ownership 11,418 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.26
Note: The table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main regression analysis. Panel A reports the statistics for the dependent
variable M&A activity. Panel B reports the statistics of the independent variables employed in the empirical analysis. Panel C reports the statistics for the
firm and industry characteristics. Panel D reports the statistics for the CEO characteristics. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2.
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the interaction term to the unexplained variance in the full model) is
attributed to the interaction term included in that model.
To further examine significant interactions, we conduct simple
slope tests (Aiken et al., 1991; Cohen et al., 2003) and calculate the
marginal effects of one governance mechanism on acquisition propen-
sity at different levels of the other governance mechanisms. In this
way, we explore how governance mechanisms interact with each
other across different levels toward acquisition propensity. Simple
slopes are the sensitivity of the dependent variable on an independent
variable at particular values of the moderator variable.
For the baseline specification, we employ a pooled OLS regres-
sion model, and we proceed with investigating the interactive rela-
tionships between the governance mechanisms of interest.
Accordingly, the baseline model before including the two-way interac-
tion terms is
M&Ai,t = β0 + β1BSIZEi,t−1 + β2NCIi,t−1 + β3DUALi,t−1 + β4VEGAi,t−1






+Yeart + Industryi + εi
ð1Þ
Subscripts i and t denote firm and year, respectively. The dependent
variable M&A is the rate of M&A activity. The main explanatory
variables are defined as above, where BSIZE stands for board size,
NCI stands for non-co-opted independence, DUAL stands for
CEO/Chair duality, VEGA stands for CEO vega, DELTA stands for
CEO delta, CASH stands for CEO cash pay, IOC stands for institu-
tional ownership concentration, and EIND stands for E-Index.
FirmControls and CEOControls are vectors of all the firm and CEO
control variables respectively, as previously described. Yeart and
Industryi represent year and industry fixed effects, respectively.
Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama–French 17-industry
classification.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 | Main results
We begin our analysis by reporting the results of the baseline model,
which includes only the main effects of the four governance mecha-
nisms of interest. Then, we augment the baseline specification by
introducing two-way interaction terms between heterogeneous gov-
ernance mechanisms. All model specifications include calendar year
and industry dummies (not displayed for brevity), as it has been shown
that acquisitions occur in waves and are industry-clustered
(e.g., Harford, 2005; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). We cluster robust
standard errors at the firm level in all regressions to control for
heteroscedasticity and within-firm correlation of residuals
(Petersen, 2009).
To investigate the interplay of governance mechanisms on
acquisition propensity, as explained, we perform an interaction
analysis (see Table 3). We explore all possible two-way interaction
terms between the main explanatory variables. For brevity, we only
present the significant pair-wise interaction terms in Models 2–6.4
Figures 1–4 illustrate the significant interactions. We also report mean
VIFs for all the estimated models in Table 3. All the mean VIF values
are lower than 4, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in
our models.
Model 1 in Table 3 reports the estimates of the first-order terms
for the firm fixed effects model. All governance and control variables
are included as main effects. We mean-center all continuous regres-
sors, before computing their product terms. Models 2 through 6 pre-
sent the significant interactions of the governance mechanisms
investigated on acquisitiveness. To plot interaction effects, we use the
maximum (high) and minimum (low) values of the two governance
mechanisms considered each time while holding all other covariates at
their mean values.
With respect to the control variables, our findings corroborate
previous studies (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Boulton et al., 2014;
Croci & Petmezas, 2015; Yim, 2013). M&A activity is significantly and
positively related to sales growth, market-to-book ratio, and cash
holdings. As expected, firms with a more active market for corporate
control in their industry, as proxied by the M&A liquidity index, exhibit
higher M&A activity. In contrast, firms are less acquisitive when they
have higher capital expenditures and when their CEOs are older and
have higher stock ownership.
In Model 2, the interaction term of two monitoring mechanisms
(NCI × IOC) is negative and significant (ΔR2 = 0.0004, p < 0.05). The
simple slope test suggests that the relationship between non-co-
opted independence and M&A activity is significant when institutional
ownership concentration is both low (simple slope = 0.019, p < 0.10)
and high (simple slope = −0.019, p < 0.10). Figure 1 displays this find-
ing. Thus, the presence of high non-co-opted independence on its
own is not sufficient to constrain acquisitiveness. But, in the presence
of highly concentrated institutional holdings, these two monitoring
mechanisms work together and interact as complements in curbing
acquisitiveness. This finding therefore lends support to the Comple-
mentarity Hypothesis.
In Model 3, we find a positive and significant interaction
between CEO delta and E-Index (ΔR2 = 0.0006, p < 0.10). As
shown in Figure 2, the simple slope test indicates that the relation-
ship between CEO delta and M&A activity is not significant when
E-Index is low (simple slope = −0.001, n.s.), but it is significant
when E-Index is high (simple slope = 0.004, p < 0.05). This result
therefore suggests that M&A activity increases with CEO delta,
but only in the presence of a higher E-Index (i.e., weaker share-
holder rights or more anti-takeover provisions and thus weaker
monitoring by the takeover market). Otherwise, in the presence of
a lower E-Index (i.e., stronger shareholder rights or fewer anti-
takeover provisions), CEO delta has a rather neutral effect on
acquisitiveness (the slope is “flat”). We, therefore, conclude that
there are complementary effects between CEO pay incentives—in
the form of CEO delta—and E-Index (takeover market proxy) on
acquisitiveness.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F IGURE 1 Complementary effect of non-co-opted independence
and institutional ownership concentration on M&A activity
F IGURE 2 Complementary effect of CEO delta and E-Index on
M&A
F IGURE 3 Substitutive effect of CEO cash pay and E-Index on
M&A activity
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In Model 4, there is a negative and significant interaction
between CEO cash pay and E-Index (ΔR2 = 0.0004, p < 0.10). A sim-
ple slope test suggests that the relationship between CEO cash pay
and M&A activity is significant when E-Index is low (simple
slope = 0.009, p < 0.05) but not significant when E-Index is high (sim-
ple slope = −0.005, n.s.). As shown in Figure 3, the results suggest
that the presence of a low E-Index (i.e., strong shareholder rights or
few anti-takeover provisions) in a firm, which has been associated
with a better ability of the takeover market to exercise control over
incumbent managers, increasing CEO cash pay is, in fact, more effec-
tive in encouraging the CEO to make risky strategic decisions in the
form of undertaking acquisition investments. This finding supports the
Substitution Hypothesis.
In Model 5, the interaction between institutional ownership con-
centration (IOC) and E-Index is negative and significant (ΔR2 = 0.0004,
p < 0.10). As portrayed in Figure 4, simple slope test suggests that the
effect of institutional ownership concentration on M&A activity is not
significant when E-Index is low (simple slope = 0.050, n.s.), but it is
significant when E-Index is high (simple slope = −0.061, p < 0.05). The
presence of a high E-Index (i.e., weak shareholder rights or many anti-
takeover provisions) in a firm suggests that managers are more insu-
lated from the disciplinary power of the takeover market and are more
likely to engage in acquisitions. In this case, the concurrent presence
of highly concentrated institutional shareholdings is necessary in order
to constrain firm acquisitiveness. This finding supports the Substitution
Hypothesis.
Finally, in Model 6, we present together all the interactions found
significant individually. Coefficients on three of the interactions
remain negative and significant (NCI × IOC, CEO cash pay × E-Index,
and IOC × E-Index), while the positive coefficient on CEO
delta × E-Index becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, in this full
model specification, the overall results we obtain are qualitatively sim-
ilar, although unsurprisingly statistically weaker. Overall, the results of
the interaction analysis provide support for both the Substitution and
Complementarity Hypotheses between governance mechanisms in the
M&A setting.
4.2 | Robustness tests
A potential concern with the interpretation of our main results is that
the relationship between M&A activity and firm-level governance
mechanisms is likely to be endogenous as firm acquisitiveness and
corporate governance can be jointly determined (due to simultaneity
or reverse causality issue). In the analysis, we lagged all independent
variables by 1 year as a step toward addressing the reverse causality
issue, but we acknowledge that this does not completely address the
issue. Unobserved factors correlated with both acquisition decisions
and corporate governance structure could bias our results. For
instance, M&A activity is strongly associated firm-level characteristics,
such as corporate culture and strategy which are difficult to obtain or
measure. As a result, some firms may be more inclined to undertake
acquisitions than others because of their own unobserved specific-
ities. Fixed effects models allow for any correlation between firm-
specific effects (unobserved firm heterogeneity) and the included
regressors in the model. Thus, we include firm fixed effects in our
regressions as a way to address omitted variable bias from omitted
variables which are time-invariant, firm-specific and unobservable.
To further mitigate unobserved heterogeneity in our estimates of
the interactive effects of governance mechanisms on firm acquisitive-
ness, we incorporate CEO fixed effects combined with firm fixed
effects, to absorb any unobserved firm and CEO heterogeneity that is
time-invariant during the tenure of a particular CEO. Prior research
has documented that managerial fixed effects affect a wide range of
firm practices including investment and financial policies, as well as
other organizational strategy variables. In particular, Bertrand and
Schoar (2003) report considerable differences in corporate decision-
making when taking into account manager effects and provide empiri-
cal evidence that specific “styles” in managerial decision-making
represent an important source of unexplained variation in several cor-
porate practices. As such, a firm/board may determine the need to
expand (refocus) and therefore decide to appoint a new CEO, who is
more (less) aggressive or more (less) prone to engage in expansion
strategies, such as acquisitions. In the same vein, Weisbach (1995)
reveals a relationship between management turnover and an
increased probability of divesting unprofitable acquisitions. It is there-
fore clear that differences across managers account for much of the
unexplained variation in several corporate practices, including acquisi-
tion policies. In our case, a CEO who is the principal decision maker
within the firm may have a particular acquisition “style” that can cor-
relate with firm-level governance mechanisms and by taking into
account these specific patterns we can estimate how much of the
unexplained variation in acquisition decisions can be attributed to
CEO fixed effects, after controlling for firm fixed effects and time-
varying firm characteristics. In our sample, 53% of the 1639 firms
employ just one CEO throughout the sample period, with the
remaining 47% employing multiple CEOs. Finally, we include acquirer
state fixed effects, to control for the potentially unusual flow of
investments from various U.S. states (i.e., Delaware) and state-level
regulatory and judicial variations, which may affect outward merger
intensity.
F IGURE 4 Substitutive effect of institutional ownership
concentration and E-Index on M&A activity
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Table 4 reports the estimation results for the main and interaction
effects using firm-CEO, acquirer state and year fixed effects in the
regressions. The estimates of the three significant interaction terms
found also in the main analysis are qualitatively similar to those
reported in Table 3 (see Models 2, 3, and 5 of Table 3). However,
while the coefficient on CEO cash pay × E-Index (Model 4) remains
negative, it becomes statistically insignificant. One possible explana-
tion is that a more stringent specification, which includes firm-CEO
fixed effects reduces the within firm-CEO variation available for
estimation.
For comparison purposes, we add all the interaction terms
together in Model 6. In the full model specification, the coefficients of
NCI × IOC and IOC × E-Index remain negative and significant, and
the coefficient of CEO cash pay × E-Index remains insignificant as in
Model 4. However, the coefficient of CEO delta × E-Index becomes
insignificant.
To sum up, although we include a variety of fixed effects (firm-
CEO, acquirer state, and year fixed effects) to mitigate endogeneity
(reverse causality) concerns and while we control for a wide range of
governance, firm, and CEO characteristics to account for observable
characteristics influencing firm acquisitiveness, our results should be
interpreted with caution, as we cannot completely rule out other
unobservable factors that could still be driving the explored
relationships.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Building on the governance bundle assumption, this paper examines
the interactive effects of firm-level governance mechanisms and
whether they act as substitutes or complements of each other in
influencing firm acquisitiveness. Departing from the traditional view
of the independent effects of corporate governance mechanisms, we
contribute to the governance literature by delving into the interde-
pendencies between corporate governance mechanisms and how
these influence a firm's acquisition propensity. In this regard, our
study contributes to the nascent but highly promising body of gover-
nance research which adopts a configurational perspective. This sug-
gests that organizational outcomes depend on the effectiveness of
certain combinations or “bundles” of corporate governance practices,
rather than on the effectiveness of any single governance mechanism
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera et al., 2012; Rediker & Seth, 1995;
Ward et al., 2009).
In sum, our results mainly provide support for both the Substitu-
tion and Complementarity Hypotheses when focusing on the
interdependence of four key governance mechanisms (board monitor-
ing, CEO pay incentives, external market, and institutional investor
monitoring) in the M&A setting. Specifically, we detected significant
complementary and substitutive effects between incentives alignment
and external market discipline mechanisms (i.e., CEO delta and cash
pay and antitakeover provisions) with respect to influencing the pro-
pensity of a firm to undertake an acquisition. These results suggest
that CEO pay incentives, in the form of delta, are more effective in
encouraging high-risk projects such as acquisitions when the CEO is
insulated from the pressures of the takeover market, while cash com-
pensation is more effective in the presence of high levels of market
discipline mechanisms. Likewise, when there are high levels of moni-
toring mechanisms in place, either in the form of a more vigilant board
of non-co-opted directors or concentrated institutional investors,
these mechanisms are complementary in constraining CEO discretion
and, in doing so, minimize agency costs by weakening the positive
effect of compensation-alignment mechanisms on acquisition propen-
sity. Another noteworthy finding, offering support to the Substitution
Hypothesis, was also that in the presence of a high E-Index, where
managers can feel insulated from the takeover market and are more
likely to engage in risky investment decisions, a high concentration of
institutional shareholders can constrain firm acquisitiveness. Results
were robust to the inclusion of CEO-firm and acquirer state-level
fixed effects, after controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying
firm characteristics.
5.1 | Theoretical and practical implications
Our study provides valuable insights for both academics and practi-
tioners. From a theoretical standpoint, our results reinforce the view
that corporate governance mechanisms do not necessarily function as
independent factors, but they operate more effectively if treated as a
bundle (Desender et al., 2016; Oh et al., 2018; Rediker & Seth, 1995).
Given that a firm's governance structure consists of various mecha-
nisms, as stated by proponents of the governance “bundles” perspec-
tive it is important to consider their interrelations in order to better
explain the effects of combinations (presence/absence) of governance
mechanisms on firm decisions and outcomes. It is thus possible that
one mechanism is more efficient than another one in producing a cer-
tain outcome, or that one mechanism would not be sufficient in the
absence of another one. For these reasons, the line of investigation
that focuses on the substitutive and complementary relationships
between governance mechanisms has attracted considerable scholarly
attention in corporate governance research (Aguilera et al., 2012;
Cuomo et al., 2016; Schiehll et al., 2014). Our results provide a better
and more nuanced understanding of how the substitutive and comple-
mentary effects of firm-level governance mechanisms operate in the
context of M&A, specifically in relation to acquisitiveness.
We extend the validity of the bundles of governance mechanisms
approach to the context of M&A and present important implications
for the design of firm-level governance mechanisms. Using the config-
urational lens, we show that governance mechanisms focusing on the
incentives alignment (i.e., CEO cash pay and delta), external market
discipline, and internal and external monitoring functions operate syn-
ergistically, and hence, any governance configuration in relation to
acquisitiveness should not treat them independently (Rediker &
Seth, 1995). Nevertheless, our findings also reveal the emergence of
complementarities between relatively dissimilar governance practices
such as board monitoring and institutional investor monitoring. We
therefore extend the work of García-Castro et al. (2013) in showing
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the existence of complementarity between heterogeneous gover-
nance practices. From a contingency perspective, corporate gover-
nance as a system of interconnected elements will change depending
on how multiple governance practices focused on effective monitor-
ing and incentive alignment interrelate in influencing strategic
decisions such as M&A propensity (Desender et al., 2016). As such,
the governance system concept implies that the effectiveness of the
different mechanisms cannot be considered in isolation but the
interdependence between them influences acquisitiveness
(Oh et al., 2018).
Moving beyond the M&A setting, it can be argued that these
competing perspectives could be prevalent in other firm decisions
which require intensive deliberation on behalf of the board of direc-
tors and other firm-specific governance mechanisms, such as deci-
sions about the CEO appointment or other critical capital expenditure
projects. Furthermore, our study complements and extends prior work
on the interdependence of governance mechanisms by investigating
their interactive effects on firm decisions and outcomes, whilst most
of the previous studies in this area examined whether one governance
mechanism substitutes or complements another mechanism
(e.g., Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Zajac &
Westphal, 1994). Our study also makes important contributions to the
extensive yet fragmented M&A research about the antecedents of
corporate acquisitions. We provide evidence that firm-level gover-
nance configurations are a crucial determinant for explaining cross
sectional differences in the acquisition propensity of firms, ranging
from a more prudent to a more aggressive acquisition behavior. Our
results demonstrate that firm-level governance mechanisms and their
interrelations are influential in the acquisition decision. These results
may help explain discrepancies in the previous M&A literature about
the multiple drivers of acquisition decisions and how these drivers
may operate in conjunction by influencing firm acquisition behavior
(Haleblian et al., 2009). Therefore, they serve as an important step in
advancing our understanding of what determines corporate
acquisitions.
Finally, our study has important practical implications. The find-
ings offer a better understanding of how different combinations or
“bundles” of firm-level governance mechanisms influence a firm's pro-
pensity to undertake acquisitions. While individual governance
mechanisms—whether intended at monitoring or incentives
alignment—aim to reduce agency problems from the separation
between ownership and control, the way these mechanisms “bundle”
may have different implications for major strategic decisions such as
corporate acquisitions. For instance, a firm that wishes to limit its
managers in pursuing M&A activity will reduce CEO delta if the proba-
bility of managerial entrenchment is high or reduce CEO cash pay if
the risk of entrenchment is low. A similar outcome can be achieved if
a firm with high institutional ownership controls the number of co-
opted board members, thus preserving high levels of non-co-opted
independence, or if one with low institutional concentration appoints
more co-opted members on the board. Alternatively, in the presence
of concentrated institutional ownership, a firm can further limit
acquisitiveness if it opts to limit shareholder rights and increase
anti-takeover provisions. On the other hand, if a firm with low institu-
tional ownership aims to increase acquisitiveness, it will seek to con-
trol co-opted board memberships or alternatively limit shareholder
rights and increase anti-takeover provisions. Meanwhile a firm with
high institutional ownership can opt to increase the representation of
co-opted members on the board to achieve a similar outcome. Finally,
increasing CEO incentives such as CEO delta and cash pay can boost
the acquisitiveness in the presence of high and low levels of anti-
takeover provisions respectively.
Taken together, our findings imply that firms should consider dif-
ferent governance configurations for different levels of acquisition
propensity, in line with the notion of “equifinality,” whereby alterna-
tive combinations of governance mechanisms can lead to similar firm
outcomes (Gresov & Drazin, 1997; Rediker & Seth, 1995). For
policymakers, these results challenge universalistic policy prescrip-
tions and support the notion that in the design of governance frame-
works, different, and equally valid, routes can allow firms to reach the
same end result.
5.2 | Limitations and future research
As customary, it is necessary to acknowledge certain limitations of our
study and consider avenues for future research. First, we have
focused on the board of directors, institutional shareholders, and the
external discipline imposed by the takeover market, namely, the
entrenchment index (E-Index), as monitoring mechanisms and on cer-
tain CEO compensation-alignment mechanisms. Given a plethora of
corporate governance mechanisms available to firms, future research
could examine the interplay of other governance mechanisms in the
context of acquisition decisions. An interesting avenue for future
work would be to examine how the compensation of top management
teams (TMT) interacts with other governance mechanisms in influenc-
ing key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Besides the
CEO, other executives of the so-called “C-suite” like the Chief Finan-
cial Officer (CFO) contribute to the firm's strategic decision making.
Other mechanisms relating to the board of directors include, for
instance, the presence of board committees, board busyness, board
diversity, directors' compensation, and other director characteristics.
Importantly, as it is widely documented in the M&A and agency litera-
tures, corporate acquisitions are often done for reasons other than
shareholder-value creation. Therefore, acquisitiveness is certainly not
a predictor of post-acquisition performance. As corporate governance
can play a potentially pivotal role on acquisition performance, a fur-
ther promising research avenue is the examination of the influence of
governance bundles on the performance of M&A.
Second, our study used only archival data. Arguably, we have
employed more refined proxies for our board characteristics than pre-
viously used “noisy” measures (e.g., non-co-opted board indepen-
dence vs. conventional measure of board independence-proportion of
independent directors). Nevertheless, our measures still prevent us
from gaining an in-depth understanding of the underlying team-based
and decision-making processes of boards of directors. Hence, a
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fruitful avenue for enquiry would be to delve into the inner workings
of boardrooms by collecting primary data through questionnaire sur-
veys and interviews of board members in order to better capture the
effects of board monitoring on acquisition decisions.
Third, we acknowledge some endogeneity concerns. In a similar
context to our study, prior research shows that CEO compensation is
higher when pursuing M&A that significantly increase firm size
(e.g., Chen et al., 2017; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Harford & Li, 2007).
Moreover, prior research has revealed that institutional investors are
more likely to invest in large firms (e.g., Gompers & Metrick, 2001;
Sias & Starks, 1997). Thus, an increase in firm size via M&A may
attract a higher level of institutional ownership in that firm. In general,
the reverse causality issue implies that we could observe different
governance structures for more acquisitive firms. A widely used
approach to address reverse causality is to find an instrumental vari-
able, which satisfies two challenging conditions, namely, the “rele-
vance” and “exogeneity” conditions (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010).
However, in practice, it is very difficult to find valid strictly exogenous
instruments (Wintoki et al., 2012), especially in the case of studies
similar to ours where multiple independent variables and their interac-
tions are employed. Furthermore, unobserved factors correlated with
both acquisition decisions and corporate governance structure could
introduce bias in our results. M&A activity may be strongly associated
with firm-level characteristics, such as corporate culture and strategy
which are difficult to obtain or measure. While we employ a host of
fixed effects (firm-CEO, acquirer state, and year fixed effects) to miti-
gate such concerns and account for observable characteristics, our
methods cannot completely rule out other unobservable factors that
may be driving our results. Finally, some of the governance bundles
that we observe are not strictly exogenous, such that changes in one
mechanism may also trigger shifts in another. While our approach
allows us to examine first-order complementary and substitutive
effects on firm acquisitiveness, we cannot draw direct conclusions
with respect to higher order (or subsequent) effects, driven by the
potentially endogenous nature of certain governance mechanisms.
We note however that—in the absence of a natural experiment—it is
extremely challenging to completely rule out remaining unobservable
characteristics.
Lastly, we have concentrated exclusively on U.S. firms in order to
explore the interdependence of firm-level governance mechanisms on
acquisition decisions. Thus, our findings apply mainly to the
Anglo-American or shareholder-oriented governance system. More
work is therefore needed to reveal if the observed interactive effects
between the governance mechanisms under investigation hold in
international settings, considering cross-national differences and dif-
ferences in the national models of corporate governance. Future
research could offer important contributions by extending the sample
to include cross-border takeovers and explore how different gover-
nance arrangements may interact with one another to influence a firm's
foreign market entry or foreign acquisitiveness. For example, this could
be investigated in countries where the continental or stakeholder-
oriented governance model is prevalent such as Germany and Japan.
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1 Henceforth, the terms “mergers” and “acquisitions” are used
interchangeably.
2 Following conventions in the M&A literature, we impose the following
standard M&A sample selection criteria: (1) the acquirers must be pub-
licly listed and the targets are either public or private firms, (2) all
exchange offers, leveraged buyouts, repurchases, recapitalisations, spi-
noffs, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, self-
tenders and privatisations are excluded, (3) the M&A deal should be
completed, (4) the acquirer must control less than 50% of the target's
shares prior to the transaction and more than 50% after the deal com-
pletion, to ensure that transactions included in the sample represent a
transfer of control, and (5) the deal value must be at least $1 million.
These screening criteria yield a sample of 16,642 completed deals over
the specified sample period.
3 By using an unbalanced panel for a rather long time period (18 years),
survivorship or attrition bias issues are mitigated, since we are able to
study companies withdrawn from databases for reasons, such as being
acquired or delisted.
4 For the sake of completeness, we provide the results of the non-
significant two-way interaction terms in Table A1.
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TABLE A2 Variable definitions
Variables Definition Data source
Panel A: Dependent variable
M&A activity It is the sum of the completed acquisition deal values in a given
year, scaled by the acquirer's total assets in the previous year
×100.
Thomson One Banker, Compustat
Panel B: Independent variables
Board size The total number of directors on the board. ISS
Non-co-opted independence
(NCI)
The number of independent directors appointed before the CEO
assumed office divided by the board size.
ISS, https://sites.temple.edu/
lnaveen/data/
CEO/chair duality A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the CEO is also
the chair of the board, and zero otherwise.
ExecuComp
CEO vega (scaled) The dollar change in the portfolio of options of the CEO for a 1%
change in the annual standard deviation of stock returns at the




CEO delta (scaled) The dollar change in the portfolio of options and equity holdings of
the CEO for a 1% change in stock price at the fiscal year-end,




CEO cash pay The natural logarithm of the CEO cash compensation (sum of salary




The percentage of the sum of shareholdings held by the five largest
institutional investors to the total shares outstanding at the fiscal
year-end.
Thomson Financial 13F, CRSP
E-Index The Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk et al. (2009) based on six anti-
takeover provisions (staggered boards, limits on amending the
charter, limits on amending bylaws, supermajority requirements
to approve a merger, poison pills, and golden parachutes). Each
firm is assigned a score, from 0 to 6, based on the number of
anti-takeover provisions that the firm has in the given year.
ISS
Panel C: Firm and industry characteristics
Firm size The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in the fiscal
year.
Compustat
Book leverage The book value of total debt (long-term plus short-term debt)
divided by the book value of total assets at the fiscal year-end.
Compustat
Sales growth The ratio of the sales in the current fiscal year to the sales in the
previous fiscal year minus one.
Compustat
Market-to-book ratio The ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of
total assets at the fiscal year-end, where the market value of
assets is defined as the book value of assets plus the market
value of common stock minus the book value of common stock.
Compustat
Cash flows Operating income before depreciation minus income taxes minus
interest expenses minus dividends (common and preferred),
divided by the book value of total assets at the fiscal year-end.
Compustat
Cash holdings Cash and short-term investments, scaled by the book value of total
assets at the fiscal year-end.
Compustat
ROA Net income divided by the book value of total assets at the fiscal
year-end.
Compustat
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets at the
fiscal-year end.
Compustat
M&A liquidity index The ratio of the value of all corporate control transactions of at
least $1 million reported by the Thomson One Banker for each
Fama–French 49-industry classification and year to the total
book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same Fama–
French 49-industry classification and year.
Compustat, Thomson one banker
(Continues)
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Variables Definition Data source
Panel D: CEO characteristics
CEO tenure The tenure of the CEO in years at the fiscal year-end. It is the
difference between the fiscal year-end date and the date that the
person became CEO.
ExecuComp
CEO age The age of the CEO in years at the fiscal year-end. ExecuComp
CEO gender A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the CEO is
female, and zero otherwise.
ExecuComp
CEO overconfidence A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the CEO is
identified as overconfident, and zero otherwise. CEOs are
overconfident if they delay the exercise of vested options which
are at least 67% in the money. We follow Campbell et al. (2011)
in order to calculate the average moneyness of the CEO's option
for each sample year. First, for each CEO-year, the average
realizable value per option is calculated by dividing the total
realizable value of options by the number of options held by the
CEO. Second, the strike price is calculated by subtracting the
average realizable value per option from the stock price at the
end of the fiscal year. The average percent moneyness of the
options is computed by dividing the stock price at the fiscal year-
end by the estimated strike price minus one.
ExecuComp
CEO ownership The shares held by the CEO, excluding options, divided by the
number of shares outstanding at the fiscal year-end.
ExecuComp, Compustat
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